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Abstract  This paper reviews the characteristics of the 
international incursions by banks since the early 1990s, 
examines the implications of the US subprime meltdown 
crisis and ensuing credit crunch for the pursuit of 
international banking activities, and provides a conceptual 
framework to help banks assess strategic decisions 
regarding the scope of their international operations in the 
years to come. We conclude that international banks, while 
remaining loyal to universal banking in terms of scope of 
activities, should become increasingly selective regarding 
the international reach of each and all components of their 
financial services offering portfolio. 
Keywords  Wholesale Bank, Universal Bank, Personal 
Banking, Wealth Management 
JEL Classification: G18, G21, G28. 
1. Introduction
The 1990s were a period of fast expansion and 
re-invention for the banking industry globally. The three 
main factors affecting the fundamentals of financial 
intermediation that caused this re-invention were major 
regulatory changes, an extraordinary acceleration in the use 
of digital technology, and the explosive growth of the 
securities markets.  
On the regulatory front, a process of financial 
liberalization came about almost simultaneously on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, the Financial Services 
Action Plan (1999) formalized a series of measures towards 
a single wholesale financial market and a more open retail 
market in the European Union, completing a process of 
gradual reduction of barriers to cross-border financial 
intermediation initiated ten years prior with the EU Second 
Banking Directive of 1989 (Dermine, 2002). In the U.S., 
over six decades of regulatory obstacles to interstate 
banking and universal banking were removed. In 1994, The 
Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking Act revoked the restrictions 
to interstate mergers among banks which had been put in 
place by the McFadden Act in 1927; and, in 1999, The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (or The Bank Holding Company 
Act) completed the elimination of regulatory constraints to 
securities underwriting activities by commercial banks 
originally set in place by The Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 
(Bodie, 2005). 
On the technological front, substantial acceleration of a 
paper-to-digital trend revolutionized how financial 
information was assembled and disseminated. Assessment, 
classification, bundling and securitization of credit risk, 
monitoring of contractual obligations and secure execution 
of trades became much cheaper and faster. 
Finally, and very much facilitated by the above, explosive 
growth of the securities markets exerted downward pressure 
on the spreads commercial banks could earn on better 
known credit risks. Their response was to engage in the 
pursuit of, both, capital markets activities and higher margin 
consumer finance endeavors, often through acquisitions at 
home and abroad. 
This long period of a purely market driven broadening of 
scope and geographic reach of activities by leading banks 
around the globe was to come to a halt in 2008. The U.S. 
subprime meltdown crisis and ensuing global credit crunch 
combined to trigger, first, a process of government assisted 
financial industry consolidation in many countries and, 
subsequently, a profound re-examination of bank 
regulations. New rules have been enacted and gradually 
enforced by jurisdictions around the world that call for 
more and better quality loss absorbing bank capital, explicit 
minimum liquidity  and stability of funding requirements, 
and tighter guidelines regarding trading book capital 
allocations. In addition, specific restrictions to the 
engagement by depositary financial institutions in certain 
types of activities have been put in place. 
In the following sessions we examine the process of 
internationalization of universal banks pre and post the 
2008 financial crisis, present a conceptual framework for 
decision-making by banks regarding the scope of their 
international operations, and conclude with a prospective 
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view for universal banking in the years to come. 
2. From Corporate Commercial to 
Wholesale Banking 
The explosive growth of the securities markets from the 
mid-1980s onwards had the effect of increasing the 
competition for high quality corporate credits. Increased 
demand by institutional investors (pension funds, insurance 
companies, asset managers, and hedge funds) put 
downward pressure on the spread banks could charge for 
corporate credit risk (Crosse et al, 1973).  As a result, 
balance sheet carry of institutional credit risk - the core 
source of revenues for the traditional corporate commercial 
bank - gradually became less and less financially rewarding 
(Marshall et al, 1994). 
The response by most leading corporate commercial 
lenders was to seek to lever on their access to - and 
understanding of the credit risk of - institutional clients to 
pursue the investment banking activities of securities 
underwriting. Some banks, such as JPMorgan (JPMorgan, 
2012) chose to build the most critical missing piece, access 
to investors - or securities sales and distribution - from 
within. Other commercial banks chose to acquire 
investment banks, the first notable one being Credit Suisse’s 
purchase of 44% equity ownership of First Boston for 
US$ 1.1 billion in October 1988 (Sterngold, 1988). 
Exhibit 1 presents a sample list of investment banks 
and/or broker-dealers acquired by commercial banking 
franchises before the 2008 financial crisis. 
Financial services offered to large corporations are also 
demanded by government entities and other financial 
institutions. As a result, most banks have eventually 
converged to group these institutional customers into a 
major single coverage umbrella, the wholesale bank 
(Apostolik et al, 2009), be it called Institutional Clients 
Group (Citicorp), Corporate and Investment Bank (BNP 
Paribas and Deutsche Bank), Wholesale Banking (TD and 
Wells Fargo) or, simply, Investment Bank (JPMorgan 
Chase). 
3. From Domestic to International 
Personal Banking 
Until the early 1980’s banks tended to divide the 
coverage of their individual customer base in, essentially, 
two major groups, consumer bank and private bank. The 
consumer bank would serve the public-at-large; the private 
bank would offer the personalized attention of specialized 
executives to high net-worth individuals and families 
(Sinkey, 1998). 
Individuals’ financial services needs combine the 
demands for payment services ( checking accounts and 
debit cards), credit products (such as overdraft accounts, 
personal, auto, mortgage and home equity loans, credit card 
facilities), investment products (such as savings accounts, 
brokerage services, investment funds), and insurance (such 
as auto, home, health and retirement).  The challenge for 
the financial institution is to establish and effectively 
manage the mix of personal banking products that can most 
efficiently capture the profit potential from its serving of 
constituencies with different characteristics and priorities 
(DiVanna, 2004). 
Exhibit 1.  Commercial Banks’ Acquisitions of Investment Banks, 1989 - 2006 
Year (Value, US$ bi)) Acquirer Country  Target Country 
1989     ($ 1.5) Deutsche Bank Germany Morgan Grenfell U.K. 
1995     ($ 1.5)  Dresdner Bank Germany Kleinworth Benson U.K. 
1995     ($ 1.0) ING Netherlands Barings U.K. 
1997     ($ 1.2) Nations Bank U.S. Montgomery Secs U.S. 
1997     ($ 1.7) Bankers Trust U.S. Alex Brown U.S. 
1998     ($ 1.4) SBC Switzerland Warburg D. Read U.K. 
1998     ($ 0.7) Credit Suisse Switzerland Banco Garantia Brazil 
1999     ($ 1.4) Chase Manhattan U.S. Hambrecht & Quist U.S. 
1999     ($10.0) Deutsche Bank Germany Bankers Trust U.S. 
2000     ($ 2.2) Citigroup U.S. Schroder U.K. 
2000    ($11.5) Credit Suisse Switzerland DLJ U.S. 
2000    ($12.0) UBS Switzerland Paine Webber U.S. 
2003    ($ 7.7) Chase Bank U.S. R. Flemings U.S. 
2006    ($ 6.8) Wachovia U.S. A.G. Edwards U.S. 
2006    ($ 2.6) UBS Switzerland Banco Pactual Brazil 
Source: by author, from newspaper clippings (NYT, WSJ, FT, Reuters, Bloomberg)  
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In response to this challenge, banks have continuously 
sought to refine their personal banking segmentation 
strategies (Venzin, 2009). In consumer banking, 
sub-segmentation tends to be guided by the customers’ 
income level, as a proxy for their likely demand for credit 
and ability to borrow. In private banking, sub-segmentation 
is primarily determined by the customers’ net-worth, as a 
proxy for their likely demand for wealth management 
assistance and willingness to invest. The explosive growth 
of the securities markets globally over the past two decades 
has had the effect of making global wealth management an 
absolute priority for the private bank. At the same time, rich 
profit margins from domestic consumer lending led several 
banks to more aggressively pursue the establishment of 
retail banking overseas. 
These two movements are described below. 
International Private Banking 
Until the late 1980s, high net-worth individuals had 
sought international private banking relationships with the 
primary objective of protection of their wealth from 
domestic turmoil and/or regulatory scrutiny.  However, a 
shift on their preferences took towards greater portfolio 
diversification and higher yields took place since then. This 
shift was the result of the same forces that transformed 
corporate and investment banking mentioned above plus the 
stimulus of specific actions taken by governments around 
the world to enact legislation and tighten bank regulations 
against tax evasion and avoidance mechanisms (Croft, 
2010). These banks must now be able to offer their clients 
also the services of third party providers of investment 
management and insurance products. 
Client coverage is typically organized along two main 
dimensions, region of origin and size of net-worth (Maude, 
2005).  Other criteria, more directly related to potential 
revenues to be generated - such as account size and amount 
of investable assets - help the financial institution to further 
sub-segment further (e.g. high, ultra-high and mega-high), 
typically allocating a smaller number of customers of higher 
revenue potential to its more seasoned private bankers. 
Competition for wealth management fees is fierce and 
players are not only the world’s largest international banks 
but also non-bank providers of investment advice and 
brokerage services (e.g. Fidelity, Charles Schwab) as well 
as leading regional private sector banks (e.g. Nordea, 
Itau-Unibanco). The resulting downward pressure on 
margins in private banking has served as an incentive for 
increased cooperation between private banking and 
investment banking divisions. First, the cost of support 
functions (such as compliance, marketing, sell-side research) 
can be shared. Secondly, business origination can be 
improved, as private bankers and investment bankers 
cooperate to cross-sell the institutions capabilities in each 
arena to bring in the most attractive advisory mandates. 
UBS and Credit Suisse already acknowledged evidence of 
this trend in their 2011 annual reports (see below). 
The Investment Bank is critical to the success of UBS’s 
strategy… We are repositioning the Investment Bank to 
align our businesses more closely with the needs of 
our core clients and the wealth management franchise 
and to address economic and regulatory changes that 
affect the entire industry (UBS AG. 2011. Form 20-F 
Annual Report of 2011, pp. 77). 
Due to the capabilities of our integrated business 
model, the ultra-high-net-worth client segment 
represents a key growth area for Credit Suisse… In 
investment banking, we have also taken steps to evolve 
our business model: We are investing in growing 
businesses where we have clear competitive 
advantages and can exploit synergies with our Private 
Banking and Asset Management businesses (Credit 
Suisse Group AG. 2011. Form 20-F Annual Report of 
2011, Letter to shareholder). 
International Consumer Banking 
The main obstacle for a bank considering entry into a 
foreign consumer banking market is the existence of well 
entrenched financial institutions that already enjoy the 
advantages of a significant distribution network, a trusted 
brand, as well as cultural integration with the customer 
base. 
Differently from wholesale and private banking - where 
the customer perceives the foreign bank as a passport to the 
world - going abroad in consumer banking requires from 
the incoming institution that it become a domestic bank 
overseas. Not surprisingly, entry by a consumer bank 
institution into a new market typically takes place through 
the acquisition of a local franchise. 
Three main factors drove a more aggressive stance by 
certain banks towards consumer banking abroad from the 
late 1980s onwards. They were: (i) technological 
breakthroughs, which facilitated automated contracting, 
settlement and control of financial transactions and allowed 
for a much lower distribution cost for retail banking 
services; (ii) the combination of attractive margins with the 
apparent reliability of consumer behavior and credit models 
(Mays, 2004); and (iii) the lowering in many countries of 
regulatory restrictions to the acquisition of major domestic 
consumer banking franchises by foreign banks. 
This balancing act between the attractiveness of margins 
versus the challenge associated with the establishment of 
viable scale operations overseas has led most banks to take 
regional approaches (Fiordelini, 2009) to international 
consumer banking. Examples of this phenomenon were the 
moves of BBVA/Spain towards Latin America, 
Commerzbank/Germany and UniCredit/Italy towards 
Central European countries (early 2000s), and Citibank/US 
towards Mexico (2001). 
Until 2008, only two banks had chosen to pursue a more 
global approach to consumer banking and in doing so, only 
taking a more aggressive stance towards a new region after 
the consolidation of strong market positions in a previous 
one. These were the cases of HSBC/UK towards the 
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Americas from the late 1990s onwards (Patil et al, 2007), 
after having achieved strong competitive positions in many 
countries in Asia and of Banco Santander/Spain towards the 
U.S. and the U.K. in the early 2000s (Ghemawat et al, 
2006), after consolidation of strong consumer banking 
positions in many countries in Latin America. 
It is worth mentioning that very low funding costs for 
banks between 2001 and 2006 (resulting, primarily, from 
historically low interest rates in the U.S.) combined with 
historically high demand for consumer credit further enticed 
the appetite of banks for consumer lending. Important 
transactions from this period were the acquisitions of 
Household Finance (U.S.) and Losango (Brazil) by HSBC 
in 2002 (HSBC Holding plc., 2002) and of Abbey National 
(U.K.) by Banco Santander in 2004 (Banco Santander S.A., 
2004). 
This long period of aggressive market driven pursuit by 
leading commercial banks around the world of, both, 
broader scope of activities (from commercial corporate and 
personal banking to universal banking, encompassing 
corporate banking, investment banking, private banking, 
asset management, commercial retail banking, consumer 
finance, and, in some cases, insurance) and greater 
geographic reach (from domestic to regional to increasingly 
international to, possibly, global) would come to a jolt in 
2008. After 2008, lack of confidence by financial 
institutions around the world on the financial health of each 
other froze interbank credit, severely affecting credit 
availability to businesses and consumers in many domestic 
jurisdictions around the world as well as the fixed income 
and equity securities markets globally. 
One indicator of the magnitude of the global credit 
contraction was the abysmal drop in syndicated loan 
volume in OECD countries, from US$ 1.2 trillion in the 
third quarter of 2007 to under US$ 400 billion in the first 
quarter of 2009 (Chui, 2010). 
4. Government Response to the Crisis 
IMMEDIATE Response (2008-2009) 
The immediate response by governments around the 
world to avoid the collapse of their financial systems was a 
combination of increased government backing of bank 
deposits, liquidity assistance by central banks in their 
jurisdictions and, where immediately necessary, direct 
intervention by national treasuries - at tax payers’expense - 
in major affected institutions. 
This treasury backed assistance to major severely 
affected FIs - later to be characterized under Basel III as 
either systemically important financial institution (SIFIs) or 
domestic systemically important financial institutions 
(D-SIFIs) took fundamentally two forms: 
a) Recapitalization of troubled financial institutions - 
typically through purchase by national treasuries of 
convertible preferred stock - with de facto takeover of 
management control. Those were the cases for Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and AIG in the US (September 2008); Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds Bank and HBOS in the 
UK (October 2008); Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and 
Anglo Irish Bank, Ireland’s three largest banks (February 
2009); Kaupting, Glittnir and Landsbanki, Iceland’s three 
largest banks (October 2008). 
b) Recapitalization of troubled financial institutions 
without a government takeover of management control, 
among which: US banks under the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP - approved by Congress in October 2008), 
most ostensibly, Citibank (November 2008) and Bank of 
America (early 2009); UBS (Switzerland, October 2008); 
ING (Deutschland, October 2008); and Commerzbank 
(Germany, Nov 2008). 
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS (2009-current) 
Recognition globally that excessive leverage, 
over-reliance on short-term funding and inadequate 
supervision by bank regulators had been at the root of the 
quasi collapse of the financial system led to a major 
revamping of bank regulation. 
The new regulations already issued and in force, 
proposed and/or under discussion can be bundled in two 
major categories: Basel II.5 and III, and Beyond Basel III. 
Basel III, proposed in June 2011 by the Basel Committee 
on Bank Supervision (BCBS), represented a severe 
tightening of the previously prevailing Basel II regulatory 
standards. In addition, it imposed two new financial 
standards, minimum liquidity and maximum nominal 
leverage (BIS, June 2011). 
Under Basel III, the set of financial requirements for 
banks to be implemented by regulators around the world in 
their individual geographic jurisdictions until 2019 can be 
summarized as follows (refer to Annex 1 for a more detailed 
perspective on Basel III and comparisons with Basel I and 
II): 
i. minimum common equity as a percentage of total risk 
weighted assets of 7% (up from 2% under Basel II) 
of total risk-weighted assets (TRWA); plus up to  
2.5% of TRWA (as a minimum countercyclical buffer 
to be imposed at the discretion of individual 
jurisdictions on banks under their supervision); plus 
an additional loss absorbency capacity of up to 3.5% 
of TRWA for systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), as such identified by the BCBS 
upon consideration of five characteristics - size, 
cross jurisdictional activity, interconnectedness, 
substitutability, and complexity (BIS, November 
2011). 
ii. minimum Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), aimed at 
ensuring banks’ resilience to survive a 30-day stress 
scenario of eroded liquidity, and minimum Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), aimed at limiting 
banks’ over-reliance on potentially unstable 
short-term funding; 
iii. higher capital charges for off-balance sheet and 
derivatives exposures; and 
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iv. maximum total leverage, through the requirement of 
minimum equity of 3% of total non-risk-weighted 
(or notional) assets. 
Whereas the Basel III framework is in phase-in gradually 
until 2019, certain changes directed at strengthening trading 
book capital requirements (particularly for securitized 
instruments) were implemented sooner (in 2010), therefore 
called Basel II.5. 
Other efforts targeted at preventing too big to fail - 
defined as situations when a financial institution has to be 
bailed-out at tax payers’ expense – included the enactment 
of specific pieces of legislation that curb certain risk taking 
activities by banks and  facilitate the timely intervention 
on and orderly liquidation of SIFIs. These measures can be 
summarized as follows: 
i. restrictions to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
trading that go beyond Basel III’s higher capital 
requirements, with the effect of pushing certain 
types of trades to central clearing platforms (CCPs);  
ii. explicit limitations to proprietary trading by banks 
(Volcker Rule in the U.S., Separate Legal Entity in 
EU; Ring Fence in the UK);  
iii. frequent (at least annual)  stress-testing of SIFIs’ 
capital adequacy by their respective central 
banks  (stress testing of capital adequacy is a 
recommendation to jurisdictional supervisors under 
the Basel III framework);  
iv. obligation for SIFIs to develop and maintain 
resolution plans (or living wills) that provide 
regulators with a roadmap for the company´s 
orderly liquidation without disruption to the 
financial system;   
v. specific legislation empowering regulators to place 
a SIFI in orderly liquidation and conduct this 
process; and 
vi. restrictions on incentive compensation, including 
the establishment of caps and claw back 
mechanisms for bonus payments to management 
and boards (mostly Liikanen report, EU). 
While final rule making on several of these measures is 
still under debate, the consequences for internationally 
active banks are clear: substantially higher capital 
requirements overall and for securities trading and 
off-balance sheet exposures in particular; severally 
regulatory restrictions to proprietary trading; and, last but 
not least, much closer regulatory scrutiny and supervision. 







The private sector response to the crisis has developed 
also in two clearly dusting stages, a government-assisted 
consolidation wave (2008-2009) and a purely market-driven 
adjustment wave (post 2010). 
The government-assisted consolidation wave was 
characterized by a number of systemically important 
transactions contracted among private sector parties with 
upfront or contingent government support. The main 
transactions of this phase involving major international 
banks were: 
a) The outright takeovers in the U.S. of important 
independent mortgage lenders and investment banks by 
some of the country’s leading universal banks: Bear Stearns 
(investment bank) and Washington Mutual (mortgage 
lender), by JPMorgan; Countrywide (mortgage lender) and 
Merrill Lynch (investment bank), by Bank of America; 
b) The recapitalizations of the two leading US investment 
banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, through high 
yield convertible preferred stock issues purchased by 
Berkshire Hathaway and Mitsubishi UFJ, respectively. 
These transactions, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008, followed the 
conversion of the legal status of Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley from broker-dealers to bank holding 
companies1; 
c) The absorptions in Europe of Dresdner Bank by 
Commerzbank (Germany, September 2008), of HBOS by 
Lloyds Bank (UK, January 2009), of Fortis by BNP Paribas 
(Belgium, March 2009), and of the mortgage lenders 
Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley by Banco 
Santander (UK, October 2008); and 
d) Contracted contingent commitments to the divestment 
of certain subsidiary operations  divestments, such as the 
one established between ING Groep and the Dutch 
government. ING Groep ended up divesting its ING-Direct 
operations in the US, UK and Canada, acquired by Capital 
One (US, 2011), Scotiabank (Canada, 2012), and Barclays 
(UK, 2013). 
The market-driven adjustment phase has evolved very 
much in sync with the coming into force of the Basel III and 
beyond Basel III regulatory requirements discussed in 
section IV. It has consisted of selective divestments on 
non-core activities (mostly, although not exclusively); other 
capital preservation initiatives; and across the board cost 
cutting efforts. 
Exhibit 2 below illustrates the importance of the 
divestment component of this market-driven adjustment 
phase for two international universal banks, HSBC and 
Citicorp. 
                                                             
 
1 This change was important for potential liquidity protection from the Fed. 
Investment banks were not necessarily under the Fed scrutiny before the 
crisis. 
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Exhibit 2.  Market-Driven Adjustment Phase, Divestments 2011 – 2016 
Bank Year Divestment Acquirer Value (US$ mm) 
HSBC 2011 Retail banking operations in Thailand Ayudhya (Thai) 115 
 2011 Private banking operations in Japan Credit Suisse n.a. 
 2012 Domestic US credit card operation Capital One (US) 2,500 
 2013 Retail banking in Central America Bancolombia (Col) 2,100 
 2015 Retail banking operations in Brazil Bradesco (Br) 3,700 
Citicorp 2012 10% equity stake HDFC (India) group of investors 1,900 
 2012-15 20% equity stake in Akbank (Turkey) group of investors 2,300 
 2013 Consumer finance operations in Brazil Itau Unibanco (Br) 1,370 
 2016 Retail banking in Brazil, Arg and Col in-progress n.a. 
Source: by author, from newspaper clippings (NYT, WSJ, FT, Reuters, Bloomberg) 
The market value shown in Exhibit 2 above captures only 
the amount paid by the buyer (in cash and/or stock) for the 
acquisition. From the standpoint of the seller, the overall 
balance sheet effect is the gain (or loss) associated with the 
divestment plus the reduction in total risk-weighted assets, 
with the resulting capital preservation for allocation 
elsewhere. 
On the issue of capital preservation, cutbacks by banks in 
securities trading platforms have been often labeled by the 
media as a move away from investment banking, as in the 
quote below: 
“Across Europe, banking giants like Barclays, 
Deutsche Bank, UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland  
have, to varying degrees, moved away from traditional 
investment banking activities because of increased 
regulation and volatile markets…”(Thomas, L., Credit 
Suisse Boss Faces Revolt From Bankers Over Strategy 
Shift, The New York Times, June 4, 2016) 
We would argue that what has been substantially affected 
by regulation is the capital charge associated with the 
inventory of securities a bank can carry, which affects the 
optimal size securities trading desks can have in terms of, 
both, capital and operating costs. This is not a trivial 
adjustment process for any institution, as it causes 
dislocation of people and compensation of those that remain 
(Thomas, 2016). But the ultimate objective of investment 
banking - to seek to match issuers and investors through the 
structuring and placement of securities (including derivative 
instruments), that meet their objectives and constraints - has 
not been abandoned.  Much to the contrary, traditional 
investment banking remains central to the wholesale 
banking strategy of leading universal banks globally. 
6. Strategic Framework and Prospective 
View 
The combination of the government and private sector 
responses to-date to the crisis has resulted in an acceleration 
of the market driven process of concentration of the 
banking industry globally that had prevailed until 2008. 
It has also reinforced the trend for banks of different 
jurisdictions around the world towards universal banking - 
including the U.S. where leading independent mortgage 
lenders and investment banks have been absorbed by 
universal banks, exception made to-date to Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley - now bank holding companies while 
not commercial banks. 
The combination of new regulatory restrictions with 
lessons learned from the crisis are pushing banks’ 
management and boards of directors to go beyond the 
non-core divestments of the sort illustrated in Exhibit 2 to 
obsessively pursue much more selective value driven 
business strategies in terms of, both, scope of activities and 
geographic reach. 
Exhibit 3 below helps clarify the strategic thinking 
outlined above. As can be observed, we classify Scope of 
Activities in five categories - Retail, Wholesale and Private 
Banking, plus asset Management and Insurance; 
Geographic Reach, in four - Domestic, Regional, 
International, and Global; and Market Share also in four - 
Leading, Important, Significant and Participant. 
Exhibit 3 - Strategic Framework 
Scope of Activities Geographic Reach Scale/Market Share 
Retail Banking   
Individual Banking   
Consumer Finance Domestic Participant Credit Cards 
Credit Cards   
SMEs Regional Significant 
Wholesale Banking   
Commercial 
Banking International Important 
Transaction Services   
Investment Banking Global Leading 
Private Banking   
Asset Management   
Insurance   
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For the sake of illustration of the framework - and based 
on publicly available information - Citibank can be seen as 
a leading domestic universal bank, a leading global 
wholesale bank, and an important global private bank; 
HSBC, a leading domestic universal bank, a leading 
international retail bank, an important global wholesale 
bank, and a significant international private bank; and UBS, 
a leading domestic universal bank, a leading global private 
bank, and an important global investment bank. 
The challenge for managements and boards is to properly 
assess their bank’s strengths and weaknesses relative to the 
competition across the full spectrum of their company’s 
Scope of Activities in each Geographic Arena under 
consideration. As a result, market positions that ensure 
acceptable and sustainable returns on thoroughly 
determined economic capital allocated for each initiative at 
each jurisdiction can be achieved. 
This will most likely imply in continued domestic pursuit 
of leading positions across the entire spectrum of financial 
services to individual and institutional clients the financial 
institution chooses to engage in their home jurisdictions; but 
reserving regional/international ambition to a narrower 
second, and global reach for only an even narrower third set 
of financial service activities. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Over the past three decades three major factors have 
combined to bring about fast expansion and a re-invention 
of the financial services globally: (i) major regulatory 
changes, facilitating the broadening of scope of activities of 
banks and their internationalization; (ii) the extraordinary 
technological evolution of the means through which 
financial transactions are contracted and settled; and (iii) the 
explosive growth of securities markets. 
These forces caused corporate commercial banks to 
aggressively pursue investment banking activities, made 
global wealth management an absolute priority for the 
private bank, and also created incentives for much closer 
cooperation between private and investment banking in 
terms of, both, cost sharing of support functions and 
cross-sell of financial services. In addition, increasingly 
attractive margins of consumer financing activities - 
resulting from particularly low funding costs for financial 
intermediaries and global economic growth between 2002 
and 2007 caused banks to also pursue the acquisition of 
major consumer finance companies and/or mortgage lenders 
at home and abroad. 
Most of the fundamental drivers of the trend towards 
universal banking observed in the almost three decades that 
preceded the 2008 U.S. subprime meltdown crisis, in 
particular the synergies between institutional lending and 
securities underwriting, and between investment banking 
and private banking, remain in place. 
On the other hand, lessons learned by banks’ boards of 
directors and significantly tighter regulations push banks to 
pursue well assessed and more selective value-driven 
business strategies in terms of scope of activities and 
geographic reach. 
The challenge for banks around the world is to properly 
assess their companies’ strengths and weaknesses across the 
full spectrum of their institutions’ financial services 
offerings vis-à-vis those of the stronger competitors in each 
geographic arena under consideration, so that economically 
viable market shares can be achieved.  In other words, to be 
capable of putting in place and sustaining an organization 
that can successfully pursue strong market positions - with 
virtually assured acceptable profitability - in all it chooses 
to do. 
For major universal banks from countries around the 
world, this will most likely imply in continued domestic 
pursuit of leading positions across the full spectrum of their 
scope of activities; but also accepting regional, international 
and global reach in progressively narrower ranges of 
financial service activities. 
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